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Abstract
Unlike the relativity theory it seeks to replace, causal set theory has
been interpreted to leave space for a substantive, though perhaps ‘lo-
calized’, form of ‘becoming’. The possibility of fundamental becoming
is nourished by the fact that the analogue of Stein’s theorem from
special relativity does not hold in causal set theory. Despite this, we
find that in many ways, the debate concerning becoming parallels the
well-rehearsed lines it follows in the domain of relativity. We present,
however, some new twists and challenges. In particular, we show that
a novel and exotic notion of becoming is compatible with causal sets.
In contrast to the ‘localized’ becoming considered compatible with the
dynamics of causal set theory by its advocates, our novel kind of be-
coming, while not answering to the typical A-theoretic demands, is
‘global’ and objective.
1 Introduction
Contemporary physics is notoriously hostile to an A-theoretic metaphysics of
time. A recent approach to quantum gravity promises to reverse that verdict:
advocates of causal set theory (CST) have argued that their framework is
consistent with a fundamental notion of ‘becoming’. A causal set, or ‘causet’,
is a discrete set of events partially ordered by a relation of causality. The
idea is that these sets ‘grow’ as new events are added one by one to the
future of already existing ones; furthermore, this ‘birthing’ process is said to
unfold in a ‘generally covariant’ manner and hence in a way that is perfectly
compatible with relativity. Here is Rafael Sorkin (2006) advertising the
philosophical pay-off:
∗The authors contributed equally to this paper.
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One often hears that the principle of general covariance [...]
forces us to abandon ‘becoming’ [...]. To this claim, the CSG
dynamics provides a counterexample. It refutes the claim be-
cause it offers us an active process of growth in which ‘things
really happen’, but at the same time it honors general covari-
ance. In doing so, it shows how the ‘Now’ might be restored
to physics without paying the price of a return to the absolute
simultaneity of pre-relativistic days.
The claim is that CST, or at least CST augmented with a dynamics such
as classical sequential growth (CSG) dynamics, rescues temporal becoming
and our intuitive notion of time from relativity. The claim is routinely made
in the pertinent physics literature, and has even found its way into popular
science magazines.1 One might not believe that our intuitive notion of time
needs or deserves rescuing, but there is no denying that if this claim is
correct it would have significant consequences for the philosophy of time.
Specifically, it may underwrite a ‘growing block’ model of the metaphysics
of time, as John Earman (2008) has speculated.
This paper has two main themes, one concerned with kinematics and the
other with dynamics. After presenting the basics of CST in the next section,
we investigate the possibilities for becoming in the theory’s kinematics in
Section 3. We show that Stein’s becoming theorem in relativity is false in
CST and try, in vain, to use the resulting freedom to escape a dilemma
imposed on becoming by relativity. Then, in Section 4, we turn to the CST
dynamics in search of a more robust notion of becoming. Trying to square
this sense of becoming with (discrete) general covariance has many costs.
However, we show that if one is willing to pay them, a novel and exotic form
of becoming is compatible with relativity. Conclusions follow in Section 5.
2 The basics of CST
The guiding idea of CST is that the fundamental structure of the world
consists of a discrete set of elementary events partially ordered by a relation
that is essentially causal. The theory finds its inspiration in a theorem
(Malament 1977) that shows the precise sense in which the causal ordering
of a sufficiently well-behaved relativistic spacetime determines its geometry,
up to a conformal factor. Paraphrased roughly, the causal order of spacetime
contains all the information we care about except for the local scale or
1Cf. e.g. Dowker (2003, 38).
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‘size’ of spacetime. Motivated by this result, Sorkin and others formulated
an approach to quantum gravity wherein discrete events supply the scale
information and causal relations supply the rest. Quantum versions are
being developed, but we will focus on the classical theory.
The basic structure of the theory is the causet C, i.e., an ordered pair
〈C,〉 consisting of a set C of otherwise featureless events and a relation
‘’ on C which satisfies the following conditions:
1.  induces a partial order on C, i.e., it is a reflexive, antisymmetric,
and transitive relation;
2. local finitude, i.e., ∀x, z ∈ C, card({y ∈ C|x  y  z}) <∞.2
These simple conditions constitute the basic kinematic assumptions of CST.
The demanded antisymmetry entails that the structure cannot contain the
causal-set equivalent of closed timelike curves. The local finitude of causets
means that they are discrete structures, and this discreteness is what leads
to some relevant differences concerning the issue of becoming in relativity.
If what at larger scales looks like a relativistic spacetime fundamentally
is a causal set, then causal set theory must give an account of how relativistic
spacetimes emerge from causal sets. But just how do relativistic spacetimes
emerge from causal sets? On the standard way of conceptualizing the prob-
lem, a necessary condition for the emergence of relativistic spacetimes from
causal sets is that the spacetimes appropriately approximates the funda-
mental causal set at the scales at which it offers an adequate description.
A classical spacetime 〈M, gab〉 is said to faithfully approximate a causal set
〈C,〉 just in case there is an injective function φ : C →M such that
1. the causal relations are preserved, i.e. ∀x, y ∈ C, x  y iff φ(x) ∈
J−(φ(y)), where J−(X) designates the causal past of the set X of
events in M;
2. on average, φ maps one element of C onto each Planck-sized volume
of 〈M, gab〉 (Smolin 2006, 210);
3. and 〈M, gab〉 does not have ‘structure’ at scales below the mean point
spacing.
The first condition demands that the causet’s causal relations are preserved
on the emergent level of the relativistic spacetime. The second condition
fixes the local scale. The third condition captures the idea that a discrete
2More colloquially, the cardinality of all these sets has to be less than ℵ0.
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structure should not give rise to an emerging spacetime with significant
curvature at a scale finer than that of the fundamental structure. Of course,
this demand fixes the fundamental scale; in CST, it is common to fix it to
the scale of Planck volumes.
Such an injective function can easily be found if we simply let the co-
domain of φ to be determined by a random ‘Poisson sprinkling’ of events onto
M. Given such a co-domain of φ inM, we obtain a causal set satisfying the
kinematic axiom by lifting the set of events together with all the relations of
causal precedence obtaining among these events. It is thus straightforward
to find a causal set that is approximated by a given globally hyperbolic
spacetime with bounded curvature.
Note that it is important that the selected events in M are picked ran-
domly and do not form some regular pattern such as a lattice. If the set of
events exhibits too much regularity, then Lorentz symmetry would be broken
because we would be able to distinguish, at an appropriately coarse-grained
scale, such a lattice from its Lorentz boosted analogue. Since there can be
no such observable differences, the selection of events must be sufficiently
random and irregular (Dowker et al. 2004).
It turns out that most causal sets sanctioned merely by the kinematic
axiom do not stand in a relation of faithful approximation to spacetimes
with low-dimensional manifolds. Thus, the vast majority of causal sets are
not approximated by a relativistic spacetime. This is the so-called ‘inverse
problem’ or ‘entropy crisis’ of causal set theory (Smolin 2006). Only if
this difficulty is successfully solved can causal set theory become a viable
approach to finding a quantum theory of gravity.
Most efforts in causal set theory are thus directed at this issue. An
obvious strategy to address the problem is to identify further conditions that
a causal set must satisfy in order to be an acceptable model of a fundamental
structure. The idea, then, is to formulate some additional axioms that
appropriately restrict the permissible causal sets to just include mostly only
those that can be faithfully approximated by a relativistic spacetime. These
additional principles are thought to specify a ‘dynamics’ and thus to select
the dynamical, and hence physical, models of the theory among its kinematic
models that merely satisfy the basic axiom. Before we get to the dynamics,
let us turn our attention to (kinematical) causal sets and the possibilities
they offer for an advocate of becoming.
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3 Facing the same dilemma?
Is temporal becoming compatible with special relativity? Howard Stein
(1991) famously proved that there is a sense of becoming compatible with
Minkowski spacetime. The reason for this is simply that the events of
Minkowski spacetime 〈R4, ηab〉 can be partitioned into past, present, and
future in a way that respects the geometric structure of Minkowski space-
time. However, as we have stressed (Callender 2000 and Wu¨thrich 2013),
just to identify some partition of events in Minkowski spacetime and to call
it ‘becoming’ does not entirely remove the pressure on becoming from special
relativity. What is addtionally required is a reason to regard that choice of
partition as answering the A-theorist’s plea to identify in the fundamental
layer of reality what in her view is required to ground our temporal expe-
rience. Focusing on the present, the worry is that any identification of a
present in special relativity either answers to the presentist’s explanatory
request or is compatible with the structure of Minkowski spacetime, but
not both. For example, one might introduce a foliation of spacetime into
spacelike hypersurfaces totally ordered by ‘time’. Presumably, that would
complement a presentist notion of a (spatially extended) present and of
becoming, but at the price of introducing structure not invariant under au-
tomorphisms of Minkowski spacetime and hence arguably violating special
relativity. Conversely, the present can be identified with invariant structures
such as a single event or the surface of an event’s past lightcone, and succes-
sive presents as a set of events on a worldline or as a set of past lightcones
totally ordered by inclusion, respectively, but such structures will have rad-
ically different properties from those ordinarily attributed to the present by
those seeking to save it (see Callender 2000 and Wu¨thrich 2013)—e.g. if we
take the past lightcone as the present, then the big bang counts, counterin-
tuitively, as ‘now’. Does the advocate of becoming face a similar dilemma
in the context of CST?
In order to address that question, let us see whether we can construct a
‘present’ from the resources of CST. Beginning with the event of the ‘here-
now’, one very natural definition of the events co-present with the ‘here-now’
are those events on a ‘spacelike slice’, technically a ‘maximal antichain’, i.e.,
a maximal set of events such that any two events are incomparable in terms
of the relation . A sequence of presents would then be a partition of a
causet into such maximal antichains. There are a number of problems with
a present thus defined. First, maximal antichains, by definition, do not have
any structure. If such a ‘spatially extended’ present were to have any spatial
structure at all, then this structure must somehow be induced by, and thus be
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ontologically dependent upon, the larger—‘temporally extended’—structure
of the causal set. Second, for any given event ‘here-now’, there are in general
many maximal antichains of which it is an element. Thus, in a loose analogy
to the many ways in which Minkowski spacetime can be foliated, the present
in the sense of the set of events co-present with the here-now would thus not
be uniquely defined. Third, and relatedly, a partition of a causal set into
such maximal antichains would not be invariant under automorphisms of
its structure. Thus, it seems that a ‘spatially extended’ present in a causal
set would very much run into difficulties of the sort encountered in special
relativity.
Let’s probe deeper. In special relativity, Stein’s theorem tells us, essen-
tially, that any binary relation ‘is definite as of’ adapted to the structure
of temporally oriented Minkowski spacetime must coincide with ‘is in the
causal past of’ lest it degenerate into the trivial or the universal relation,
modulo a choice of temporal direction.3 One might now expect that a state-
ment analogous to Stein’s theorem holds in CST as well. After all, there is
an obvious sense in which the causal structure of causal sets is very much
like that of Minkowski spacetime—indeed, CST is premised upon the idea
that special relativity gets the causal structure of spacetimes as partial or-
derings among events basically right. Thus, it may appear as if a causal set
is merely a discrete version of Minkowski spacetime. This expectation, as
natural as it may be, is disappointed.
Stein’s notion of becoming is expressed as a binary relation R between
spacetime events. The relation R can be interpreted as ‘is settled as of’,
‘having become as of’, or ‘is determinate as of’ and similar notions. Imposing
various conditions on becoming, Stein proves that a non-boring relation that
respects the basic structure of Minkowski spacetime exists. It turns out to
be the relation that obtains between and only between an event and events
in that event’s causal past. In particular, he assumes that R is a reflexive,
non-trivial, and non-universal relation on a Minkowski spacetime 〈Rn, ηab〉
of at least two dimensions (n ≥ 2) invariant under automorphisms that
preserve the time-orientation and generally is Lorentz covariant. Stein then
shows that if Rab holds for some ordered pair of points 〈a, b〉, with a, b ∈ Rn,
such that ab is a past-pointing (timelike or null) vector, then for any pair
of points 〈x, y〉 in Rn, Rxy holds if and only if xy is a past-pointing vector.
3A universal binary relation obtains between any two objects in the domain, while a
trivial binary relation only obtains between any object and itself. Since, given a domain, all
trivial relations are extensionally identical (and hence extensionally identical to ‘identity’,
the most important trivial relation), as are all universal relations, we use the definite
article in both cases.
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Figure 1: The counterexample causet.
The upshot is that for any event p in Minkowski spacetime, all the events
in p’s causal past have become for it.
The analogue of this theorem, however, is straightforwardly false in CST.
To quickly see this, consider the simple causet in Figure 1—the ‘counterex-
ample causet’.4 On this causet, a reflexive and transitive relation R can be
defined (set-theoretically, as is standard) as follows:
R = {〈a, a〉, 〈b, b〉, 〈c, c〉, 〈d, d〉, 〈b, a〉, 〈c, a〉, 〈d, b〉, 〈d, c〉, 〈d, a〉, 〈b, c〉, 〈c, b〉}.
In other words, this relation R—‘is definite as of’—holds of any event and
itself, of any event and any other event in its causal past, and of any ‘space-
like related’ pairs of events such as b and c in Figure 1, and not otherwise.
It is clear that this relation does not obtain only between events and events
in their causal past, as it obtains between the spacelike related events b and
c! Nor is this R the trivial reflexive relation or the universal relation (e.g.
〈b, d〉 is not an element). Nonetheless R is invariant under automorphisms
of the structure, as it only relies on the causal relations themselves, except
for the last two pairs, which are however symmetrically included and obtain
between points with identical ‘relational profiles’ and hence are invariant
under structure-preserving maps. In fact, we would expect to find relations
violating the analogue of Stein’s theorem whenever we have ‘non-Hegelian
pairs’ of events, i.e. pairs of events whose relational profile is identical. Au-
tomorphisms of a causal set map events to events in the causal set such that
if a pair of events was standing in a relation of causal precedence prior to
the mapping, their image will also do so.5 Of course, one may take this very
fact to indicate that non-Hegelian pairs are not physically distinct events.
4In the figure, we follow the usual practice of not including edges implied by reflexivity
and transitivity.
5Although the counterexample causet does admittedly not give rise to a relativistic
spacetime, it could be a small proper part of a much larger causet that can be faithfully
embedded into a relativistic spacetime. Toward the end of this section, we will return to
the issue of how relevant and generic the counterexample is.
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Specifically for the counterexample causet, the pairs 〈b, c〉 and 〈c, b〉 can
be included in R without R collapsing into the universal relation, as happens
in Minkowski spacetime. There, whenever a spacelike vector is included in
R, invariance under automorphisms demands that all spacelike vectors are
in R; requiring transitivity then collapses R to the universal relation. This
does not happen in cases such as the one represented in Figure 1 because
events with identical causal profile can be mapped onto each other without
altering the causal structure at all. Thus, we see that in CST there can be
non-trivial and non-universal relations of ‘being definite as of’ that do not
collapse to events in the causal past of the reference event. This gives the A-
theorist novel ways of constructing physically kosher fundamental relations
of co-presentness. But is it enough to drive a wedge into the dilemma faced
by advocates of relativistic becoming?
Let us have a closer look at non-Hegelian subsets. A non-Hegelian subset
H ⊆ C of events in a causal set 〈C,〉 is a set consisting of distinct events
x1, ..., xk in C with the same relational profile, i.e., {x1, ..., xk|∀xi, xj ,∀z ∈
C such that z 6= xi and z 6= xj ,¬(xi  xj) and z  xi ↔ z  xj and xi 
z ↔ xj  z, where i, j = 1, ..., k}.6 It is clear that any pair of distinct
elements of a non-Hegelian subset cannot stand in the relation , i.e., they
are by necessity ‘spacelike’ to one another.
Now suppose we have a causal set with a non-Hegelian pair, i.e., a non-
Hegelian subset of cardinality 2. The relation R can thus symmetrically
obtain between them in a way that leaves R automorphically invariant,
which is what led to the violation of Stein’s result transposed to CST. If we
subtract from R all pairs which stand in , then we will end up with the
non-Hegelian subsets. Since their elements stand in R symmetrically, these
will be events which can be interpreted to be ‘determinate as of’ one another.
In this sense R \  gives us an automorphically invariant way to define co-
presentness. And this in a theory which is supposed to ground relativity
and whose only fundamental relation is relativistic causal precedence!
Do we now have a tool allowing us to thwart the original dilemma be-
tween answering the presentist’s explanatory needs and compatibility with
relativity? For that to work, we would have to find large non-Hegelian sub-
sets consisting of a nearly maximal antichain for the present to be at least
almost global, and we would need many of them to have a decent sequence
6Singleton sets of events are ruled out by the stipulation that any events in a non-
Hegelian subset are pairwise unrelated by the ordering. Thus, 1 < k ≤ n for a causal
set of n events if there are any non-Hegelian subsets. The stipulation also implies that a
non-Hegelian subset is an antichain, hence underwriting the following last sentence in the
paragraph.
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of subsequent presents.
However, this is not what we generically find in causal sets.7 Although
we know of almost no pertinent analytical results or numerical estimates, we
suspect that large and many non-Hegelian subsets are few and far between.8
The reason is that there are many more irregular structures that satisfy the
kinematic axiom than there are structures which are sufficiently regular to
sustain large and many non-Hegelian subsets. If this is right, then there
are no grounds on which to expect that the few and small remaining non-
Hegelian subsets can generically give rise to any macroscopic present.
What about those causal sets which do have large and many non-Hegelian
subsets and thus satisfy the condition necessary for an evasion of the dilemma?
They clearly satisfy the kinematic axiom, so are not ruled out unless we im-
pose additional dynamical laws that they violate. Yet observe that in these
rare circumstances where the necessary condition is satisfied, we have reg-
ular ‘lattice’ structures. As explained above, such highly regular structures
would lead to a detectable violation of Lorentz symmetry. This has the great
virtue of making it empirically testable whether—if CST is true at all, of
course—the fundamental causal set exhibits such regularities. We take the
absence of any empirical tests pointing to a violation of Lorentz symmetry
(Mattingly 2005) to be an indication that the actual fundamental causal
set—again, if any—cannot be highly regular.
In sum, rather than escape the dilemma, it seems CST embraces it and
even makes it rigorous. That is, generically there will not be non-Hegelian
subsets sufficient to express the present, and when there are, they will violate
Lorentz invariance.
Of course, an advocate of becoming happy with Stein’s relation can
easily find a counterpart within causal sets. This would make becoming more
local and observer-dependent, just as the Stein relations based on the causal
structure of Minkowski spacetime are.9 Given the structure of causets, it
is straightforward to define relativistically kosher forms of becoming that
essentially imitate the past lightcone becoming already compatible with the
geometry of Minkowski spacetime; for instance, let ‘is definite as of’ coincide
7‘Generic’ once the Kleitman-Rothschild hordes have been contained.
8An exception is an unpublished result found by David Meyer: the expected number
of non-Hegelian pairs for a causet obtained from N samples of a uniform process in an
Alexandrov neighbourhood of (1 + 1)-dimensional Minkowski spacetime is 1 in the limit
as N goes to infinity. Since larger non-Hegelian subsets would contain more non-Hegelian
pairs, their expected number would presumably be smaller and quickly tend to zero in the
limit as the non-Hegelian subset grows.
9Clifton and Hogarth’s (1995) similar view is an instance of observer-dependent be-
coming.
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with the causet order relation. However, to those seeking a genuinely ‘tensed’
metaphysics of time, Stein’s result has always had limited appeal. At best
it defines a notion of becoming compatible with Minkowski spacetime. But
if one desires that Minkowski spacetime itself grows or changes, as many
metaphysicians of time do, then Stein’s project is simply seen as irrelevant.
As Callender (2000) and Skow (2009, 668n) point out, there is a difference
between notions of becoming and flow that are observer- or event-dependent
and those that are independent of observers or events. If one wants the world
to become, as tensers do, then one wants a more substantial perspective-
independent sense of becoming. Can CST provide us with this?
4 Taking growth seriously
There is nothing in the kinematics of CST that suggests any kind of onto-
logical growth. To find anything smacking of growth, one needs to turn to
the dynamics, which is imposed to restrict the vast set of kinematically pos-
sible causets to the physically reasonable models of the theory. The usual
dynamics for a causal set is a law of sequential growth. What grows are the
number of elements, and it is assumed that the ‘birthing’ of new elements is
stochastic. Suppose Ω(n) is the set of n-element causets. Then the dynamics
specifies transition probabilities for moving from one C ∈ Ω(n) to another
C′ ∈ Ω(n+ 1).
Innumerable growth laws are possible. Yet a remarkable theorem by
Rideout and Sorkin (2000) shows that if the classical dynamics obeys some
natural conditions such as label-independence and relativistic causality, then
the dynamics is sharply constrained. In particular, it must come from a class
of dynamics of sequential growth known as ‘generalized percolation’. Since
the differences within this class will not matter for what follows, we can
illustrate the idea with the simplest classical sequential growth dynamics
that satisfies the Rideout-Sorkin theorem, namely, transitive percolation, a
dynamics familiar in random graph theory.
A simple way to understand this dynamics is to imagine an order of
element births, labeling that order using integers 0, 1, 2... such that they are
consistent with the causal order, i.e., if x  y, then label(x) < label(y). (The
reverse implication does not hold because the dynamics at some label time
may birth a spacelike event, not one for which x  y.) We begin with the
causet’s ‘big bang’, the singleton set. Now when element 2 is birthed, there
are two possibilities: either it is causally related to 1 or not, i.e., 1  2 or
¬(1  2). Transitive percolation assigns a probability p to the two elements
10
being causally linked and 1−p to the two elements not being causally linked.
Ditto now for element 3, which has probability p of being causally linked to
1 (2) and 1− p of not being causally linked to 1 (2). The dynamics enforces
transitive closure, so if 1  2 and 2  3, then 1  3. Another way to
conceive of the dynamics is that when each new causet C′ is born, it chooses
a previously existing causet C to be its ancestor with a certain probability.
The heart of the idea that CST rescues becoming involves taking sequen-
tial growth seriously:
The phenomenological passage of time is taken to be a mani-
festation of this continuing growth of the causet. Thus, we do
not think of the process as happening ‘in time’ but rather as
‘constituting time’... (Rideout and Sorkin 2000, 024002-2)
Becoming is embodied in the ‘birthing’ of new elements.
Although we are interested in becoming, we should immediately remark
that sequential growth is certainly compatible with a tenseless or block pic-
ture of time. In mathematics a stochastic process is defined as a triad of
a sample space, a sigma algebra on that space, and a probability measure
whose domain is the sigma algebra. Transition probabilities are viewed
merely as the materials from which this triad is built. In the case at hand,
the sample space is the set Ω = Ω(∞) of past-finite and future-infinite la-
beled causets that have been ‘run to infinity’. The ‘dynamics’ is given by
the probability measure constructed from the transition probabilities; for de-
tails, see Brightwell et al (2003). On this picture, the theory consists simply
of a space of tenseless histories with a probability measure over them.10
However, let’s take the growth seriously. There are different extents
to which this can be done. At a more modest level, and consistent with
explicit pronouncements by advocates of causet becoming, we can articulate
a localized, observer-dependent form of becoming. Here, the idea is that
becoming occurs not in an objective, global manner, but instead with respect
to an observer situated within the world that becomes. The only facts of
the matter concerning becoming are local, and are experienced by individual
observers as they inch toward the future. In Sorkin’s words, which are worth
quoting in full,
[o]ur ‘now’ is (approximately) local and if we ask whether a dis-
tant event spacelike to us has or has not happened yet, this
10This interpretation corresponds to Huggett’s first option (2014, 16), which is fully
B-theoretic. When we consider ‘taking growth seriously’, we mean to essentially follow
the second route he offers: augmenting the causal structure with an additional, but gauge-
invariant, dynamics.
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question lacks intuitive sense. But the ‘opponents of becoming’
seem not to content themselves with the experience of a ‘situ-
ated observer’. They want to imagine themselves as a ‘super
observer’, who would take in all of existence at a glance. The
supposition of such an observer would lead to a distinguished
‘slicing’ of the causet, contradicting the principle that such a
slicing lacks objective meaning (‘covariance’). (2007, 158)
According to Sorkin, instead of “super observers”, we have an “asyn-
chronous multiplicity of ‘nows’ ”. It seems fairly straightforward that a per-
fectly analogous kind of becoming can be had in the context of Minkowski
spacetime. Indeed, ‘past lightcone becoming’, based on Stein’s theorem,
and ‘worldline becoming’, as articulated by Clifton and Hogarth (1995),
both satisfy the bill.11
Although Sorkin himself remains uncommitted concerning whether the
analogy holds, Fay Dowker (2014) rejects it, arguing that ‘asynchronous be-
coming’ is not compatible with general relativity, but only with CST with
a dynamics like the one provided by the classical sequential growth (and
hence also not with the purely kinematic CST). The reason for this seems
to be ultimately metaphysical, because only with the dynamics do we get
not just the events, but their ‘occurrence’. Since in general relativity space-
time events do not ‘occur’, goes the thought, there is no genuine form of
becoming possible. Against this, we note firstly that (a large subsector of)
general relativity certainly can be described in a ‘dynamical’ manner via its
many ‘3+1’ formulations.12 To make her objection, Dowker would first need
to elaborate the reasons why a 3+1 dynamics does not provide the ‘occur-
rence’ she desires. Furthermore, we note here a possible tension. If occur-
rence is simply a label for some events from the perspective of other events,
then there is no problem—but then we note that such labels can be given
consistently in general relativity too. But if occurrence implies something
metaphysically meaty, such as existence or determinateness—then there is
a possible tension between occurrence and the local becoming envisioned by
Sorkin and Dowker. If spacetime events that are spacelike related do not
exist for each other, for instance, then that is a radical fragmentation of
reality.13 Not only would that be a high cost to introduce becoming, but it
11Cf. also Arageorgis (2012) who makes a similar point.
12Cf. Wald (1984, Ch. 10).
13In Pooley’s view (2013, 358n), dynamical CST should best be interpreted as a “non-
standard A Theory” in Fine’s (2005) sense, i.e., as giving up “the idea that there are
absolute facts of the matter about the way the world is.” (2013, 334)
12
is also one that, again, could be introduced in the ordinary theory.
Our present interest is to determine whether a more ambitious, objective,
global, observer-independent form of becoming is compatible with CST-cum-
dynamics in a way that does not violate the strictures of relativity. In other
words, does Sorkin’s assertion in the last sentence of the indented quote
above holds up to scrutiny? We will argue that it does not and that there
is a weak sense in which a fully objective kind of becoming with relativistic
credentials can be had.
Even before worrying about relativity, one might be concerned that an
analogue of Jack Smart’s ‘how fast does time fly?’ objection applies when
we turn to the dynamics (Smart 1966). Smart famously argued that if
time changes and change is the having of different properties at different
times, then it seems that at least two times are needed for any metaphysics
wherein the present moves. That seems to be the case here too. Remember
that the elements being created are spatiotemporal. What does a dynamics
over variables that are spatiotemporal even mean? We have an external
time given by the dynamics—the time in which growth happens—and an
internal time given by the spatiotemporal metric the causet inherits from
its embedding into a relativistic spacetime. The causal set counterpart of
Smart’s question beckons: how fast are elements born?
Is Smart’s objection fatal to the idea of cosmological ‘growth’? Here
philosophical opinion divides. Anticipating Smart’s question, C.D. Broad
(1938) argued that the kind of change that time undergoes is a sui generis
kind of process. It is not to be analyzed as qualitative change, i.e. the
change of properties with respect to time. It is its own thing. We get a hint
of that answer in Rideout and Sorkin’s claim that birthing constitutes time
and is not in time. The causet growth is time, in some sense, not something
that happens in time. Like Broad, Bradford Skow (2009) believes that a
second-order time is not required to make sense of a substantive notion of
temporal passage. He regards this apparent second time dimension as a
kind of metaphor to understand the action of primitive tense operators. For
philosophers such as Broad and Skow, Smart’s objection has no purchase.
Others, however, might complain that appeal to sui generis processes and
primitive logico-linguistic devices leaves a lot to be desired in terms of phys-
ical clarity.14 No matter our personal reactions to this issue, we will bracket
this worry since stopping at this point would be needlessly controversial.
After all, we are trying to give CST becoming its best chance.
The problem with taking the primitive growth as vindicating becoming
14Or simply not evade the problem, as pressed by Pooley (2013, Section 4).
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Figure 2: Alice’s and Bob’s birthday parties come into being.
is that advocates of CST uniformly wish to treat the labeling time as ‘fic-
titious’. The reason is that the choice of label is tantamount to picking a
time coordinate x0 in a relativistic spacetime. Any dynamics distinguishing
a particular label order will be non-relativistic. Not wanting the dynamics
to distinguish a particular label (‘coordinatization’), the authors impose dis-
crete general covariance on the dynamics. This is a form of label invariance.
The idea is that the probability of any particular causet arising should be
independent of the path to get to that causet. In particular, if α is one path
from the singleton causet to an n-element causet, and β is another path to
the same causet, then the product of the transition probabilities along the
links of α is the same as that for β (and any other such path).
To get a feel for this, suppose that the singleton set births a timelike
related element, Alice’s birthday, at label time l = 1, and then this 2-
element causet births a third element, Bob’s birthday, spacelike related to
the other two events at label time l = 2. That is path α. Path β instead
births Bob’s birthday spacelike related to the singleton set, and then births
Alice’s birthday timelike related only to the singleton set. Discrete general
covariance implies that the product of the transition probabilities getting
from the singleton to that 3-element causet is the same. Used as a condition
to derive the dynamics, all sequential growth dynamics compatible with CST
possess this symmetry. The further interpretation is that the probabilities
respect this symmetry because the labels are pure gauge, that there is no
fact of the matter about which path was taken.
With this simple example in mind, one can immediately see the trouble
with regarding this growth as a real physical process (see Figure 2). Suppose
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the event a timelike related to the singleton set is Alice’s birthday party and
suppose the event b spacelike related to both is Bob’s birthday party. To
enforce consistency with relativity, there is no fact of the matter about
which one happened right after the singleton element event. To say which
one happened ‘first’ is to invoke non-relativistic concepts. It is therefore
hard to understand how there can be growth happening in time. Seeing
the difficulty here, Earman (2008) suggests a kind of philosophical addition
to causal sets, one where we imagine that ‘actuality’ does take one path or
another. With such a hidden variable moving up the causet, we do regain a
notion of becoming. But as Aristidis Arageorgis (2012) rightly points out,
such a move really flies in the face of the normal interpretation of these
labels as pure gauge.15 The natural suggestion, espoused by (almost all?)
philosophers of physics, is then that the above tenseless interpretation is
best because it does not ask us to imagine that one event came first.
Perhaps the sensible reaction to this problem is to abandon the hope
that CST does produce a novel sense of becoming. Still, we are tempted to
press on. The intuition motivating us is as follows. True, the dynamics is
written in terms of a choice of label, but we know that a consistent gauge
invariant dynamics exists ‘beneath’ this dynamics. In fact, rewriting the
theory in terms of a probability measure space, as indicated above, one can
quotient out under relabellings to arrive at a label-invariant measure space
(for construction and details, see Brightwell et al 2003). And one thing
that we know is gauge invariant is the number of elements in any causet.
Focusing just on these and ignoring any labeling, we do have transitions
from C to C′ and so on. There is gauge-invariant growth.
The problem is that we are generally prohibited from saying exactly
what elements exist at any stage of growth. Take the case of Alice and
Bob above. The world grows from C1 to C2 to C3. That’s gauge invariant.
We just cannot say—not due to ignorance, but because there is no fact
of the matter—whether C2 consists of the singleton plus Alice’s party or
the singleton plus Bob’s party. Causal set reality does not contain this
information. There simply is no determinate fact as to whether C2 contains
a or b; but there is a determinate fact that it contains one of them. If it is
coherent, therefore, to speak of a causet having a certain number of elements
but without saying what those elements are, then CST does permit a new
kind of—admittedly radical and bizarre—temporal becoming.
Whether this notion of becoming is coherent depends on the identity
conditions one has for events. If to be an event, one has to be a particular
15Cf. also Butterfield (2007, 859f).
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type of event with a certain character, then perhaps the idea is not coher-
ent. After all, what is the C2 world like? It does not have Alice and Bob
in it (that’s C3), nor does it have neither Alice nor Bob in it (that’s C1).
The world determinately has Alice or Bob in it, but it does not have de-
terminately Alice or determinately Bob. ‘Determinately’ cannot penetrate
inside the disjunction. Notice that this feature is a hallmark of vagueness
or of metaphysical indeterminacy more generally. Without going into any
details of the vast literature on vagueness, let us note that there is a lively
dispute over whether there can be ontological vagueness. The causal set
program, interpreted as we have here, supplies a possible model of a world
that is ontologically vague. Further discussion of this model seems to us
worthwhile.
First, we would simply like to point out that Ted Sider (2003) has sup-
plied arguments that existence cannot be vague. That existence cannot be
vague or indeterminate was a central assumption of his argument to four-
dimensionalism in his [2001]. In fact, he asserts (2003, 135) that anyone who
accepts the premise that existence cannot be vague is committed to four-
dimensionalism, the thesis that objects persist by having temporal parts. To
the extent to which many advocates of becoming reject four-dimensionalism
anyway, they would thus be open to embrace ontological indeterminacy even
if Sider’s arguments of 2001 and 2003 were successful. And they may well
not be: one of them, for instance, infers to the impossibility of vague exis-
tence from the claim that it cannot be vague how many things there are in
a finite world (2001, 136f). Obviously, a defender of observer-independent
becoming in CST may agree that it is at no moment vague how many events
there exist, but nevertheless disagree that existence cannot be vague. Thus,
we may have ontological indeterminacy without vagueness in the cardinality
of the (finite) set of all existing objects.
One may be worried that on this notion of becoming in CST, no event
in a future-infinite causet may ever be determinate until future infinity is
reached, at which point everything snaps into determinate existence. This
worry is particularly pressing as realistic causets are often taken to be future-
infinite. So does any event ever get determinate at any finite stage of be-
coming? In general, yes. One way to see this is by way of example. As
it turns out, causets based on transitive percolation in general have many
‘posts’, where a post is an event that is comparable to every other event, i.e.,
an event that either is causally preceded or causally precedes every other
event in the causet. Rideout and Sorkin interpret the resulting cosmological
model as one in which “the universe cycles endlessly through phases of ex-
pansion, stasis, and contraction [...] back down to a single element.” (1999,
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Figure 3: Becoming at post p.
024002-4)16 Consider the situation as depicted in Figure 3. There is a post,
p, such that N events causally precede p, while all the others—potentially
infinitely many—are causally preceded by p. At stage N − 1, shown on the
left, there exist N − 1 events. At this stage, all the ‘ancestors’ of p except
those three events which immediately precede p, shown in black, must have
determinately come to be. Of the three immediate predecessors, shown in
grey to indicate their indeterminate status, two must exist; however, it is
indeterminate which two of the three exist. At the prior stage N − 2, the
grey set of events existing indeterminately would have extended one ‘gener-
ation’ further back, as it could be that two comparable events are the last
ones to come to be before the post becomes. At the next stage, stage N ,
N events exist and it is determinate that all ancestors of p exist. There is
no ontological indeterminacy at this stage. Event p has not yet come to be
at either stage and is thus shown in white. At stage N + 1, not shown in
Figure 3, event p determinately comes into existence. At stage N+2, one of
the two immediate successor to p exists, but it is indeterminate which one.
And so on.
One may object that this interpretation of the dynamics of a future-
infinite causet presupposes a given final state toward which the causet evolves.
Even though everything in the preceding paragraph is true under the suppo-
sition that the final causet is the one represented in Figure 3, the objection
goes, at stage N it is not yet determined that p is a post, as there could have
been other events spacelike-related to p. Given that it is thus indeterminate
whether p is indeed a post, and since this is the case for all events at finite
stages, no events can thus snap into determinate existence at any finite stage
of the dynamical growth process.
16Cf. also Bolloba´s and Brightwell (1997).
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First, it should be noted that even if this objection succeeds, it is still
the case that it is objectively and determinately the case that at each stage,
one event comes into being and that thus the cardinality of the sum total
of existence grows. Although the ontological indeterminacy remains maxi-
mal, there is a weak sense in which there is objective, observer-independent
becoming. Second, if the causet does indeed not ‘tend’ to some particular
future-infinite causet, then all existence would always be altogether indeter-
minate (except for the cardinality). There would be no fact of the matter,
ever, i.e., at any finite stage, of how the future will be, or indeed of how any-
thing ever is. If this is the right way to think about the metaphysics of the
dynamics of CST, we are left with a wildly indeterminate picture. Third, it
should be noted that the mathematics of the dynamics is only well-defined
in the infinite limit; in particular, for there to be a well-defined probability
measure on Ω, we must take Ω = Ω(∞) (Sorkin 2007, 160n; Arageorgis
2012, Section 3), which can be interpreted to mean that the future-infinite
‘end state’ is metaphysically prior to the stochastic dynamics that grows the
causet to that ‘state’.
Note the strange features of this metaphysics. First, note that many
philosophers, from Aristotle to today, have thought that the future is in-
determinate (see, e.g., Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2011 and references therein).
According to some versions of this view, it is determinately true that tomor-
row’s coin flip will result in either a head or a tail, but it is not determinate
yet which result obtains. Vagueness infects the future. We note that the
above causal set vagueness is quite similar, but with one big difference: on
the causal set picture, the past too can be indeterminate! In our toy causal
set, it is not true at C3 that C2 determinately is one way rather than the
other.
Second, as a causet grows, events that were once spacelike to the causet
might acquire timelike links to future events. If we regard the growth of
a new timelike link to a spacelike event as making the spacelike event de-
terminate, modulo the above type of vagueness, then this is a way future
becoming can make events past. That is, there is a literal sense in which one
can say that “the past isn’t what it used to be”. Strange as this may sound,
it should be noted that the ‘growth’ of the past stands in perfect analogy to
that in past-lightcone becoming.
Finally, although we don’t have space to discuss it here, observe that
despite appearances transitive percolation is perfectly time reversal invari-
ant. This allows the construction of an even more exotic temporal meta-
physics. If we relax the assumption that events can only be born to the
future of existing events, then it is possible to have percolation—and hence
18
becoming—going both to the future and past. Choose a here-now as the
original point. Then it is possible to modify the theory so that the world
becomes in both directions, future and past. Of course, similarly, we could
have a causal set that is future-finite and only grows into the past, and thus
is past-infinite.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated the claim that CST rescues temporal becoming. At
the kinematical level, CST does offer new twists in dealing with time and rel-
ativity, but the basic contours of the relativistic challenge remains. Serious
constraints also threaten becoming if we take the time in CST’s dynamics
seriously too. Here, however, if one is open to the costs of a sufficiently
radical metaphysics, we maintain that there is a novel and exotic type of
temporal becoming possible.
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